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INTERNATIONAL LAW CLIENTS:
THE WISDOM OF NATURAL LAW
Robert John Araujo, S.J.*
INTRODUCTION
Academic and professional interest in international law has
soared in the last several decades. The number of students now
desiring to study this field has necessitated the introduction of a
wide variety of courses into law school curricula. In this regard,
the proliferation of many new graduate programs in international
law has paralleled the growth in graduate legal education gener-
ally. Interestingly, the increased interest in international law has
not been limited to the academy. Indeed, the interests of the acad-
emy only reflect a surge in the number of lawyers now confronting
international legal issues at work. Lawyers in numerous practice
areas, including military practice, corporate law, and labor-man-
agement relations are finding it essential to expand their knowl-
edge of international law.
This essay will not serve as a primer in international law.
Rather, it will alert the reader to the foundation of many interna-
tional law principles-natural law. The natural law can be distin-
guished from the positive law which is defined as any source of
legal authority posited by human beings. Illustrations of the posi-
tive law are as diverse as the Internal Revenue Code of the United
States' or the Racial Purity Laws of Nazi Germany.2 Today, many
practitioners find themselves dealing with multilateral instruments,
such as treaties, as their principal source of law. If the elements of
these instruments come from negotiations amongst the human par-
ties, are the instruments examples of positive law? In one sense,
the answer is "yes." However, even instruments that codify the
international law principles, such as modern treaties, often rely on
fundamental principles stemming from the natural law.3
* Professor of Law, Gonzaga University; Stein Fellow, Fordham University
School of Law, 2000-2001. A.B., J.D., Georgetown University; Ph.B. St. Michael's
Institute, Gonzaga University; M.Div., S.T.L., Weston Jesuit School of Theology;
B.C.L. Oxford University; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia University.
1. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
2. THE NUREMBERG LAWS ON CITIZENSHIP AND RACE (1935), http://
www.btinternet.com/-ablumsohn/laws.htm.
3. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF PEACE 16-25 (Sir Humphrey Walclock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
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Codified international law often relies on international law prin-
ciples derived from custom-the unwritten evolving law of nations.
At the heart of custom is the natural law. Hugo Grotius, no stran-
ger to the natural law and sometimes considered the father of mod-
ern international law,4 acknowledged his debt to predecessors such
as the Spanish theologians Francis di Vitoria and Francis Suarez.5
As commentators on the political institutions of the late fifteenth
and early sixteenth centuries, they relied on the Scholastic tradi-
tion6 and the natural law principles upon which it was based.7
These writers contributed to customary principles that had been
recognized by many states that were politically and economically
involved with their fellow nations.
Part I of this essay will describe the natural law and its bearing
on the practice of international law and the legal relationships of
the world's peoples.8 Part II describes the concept of "the common
good," a foundation of natural law. Part III introduces the term
"solidarity,"9 and the collaboration required to achieve the com-
mon good. Part IV describes the concept of "subsidiarity," a form
4. Id. at 28.
5. See, e.g., Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres in 2 CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 925, 929 (James Brown Scott ed. & Francis W. Kelsey trans.
1925) (1625). Grotius's reliance on (and occasional disagreement with) the work of di
Vitoria and Suarez can be found in the list of authors cited at pages 925 (Suarez) and
929 (di Vitoria, sometimes referred to as de Victoria).
6. The "Scholastic Tradition," or "Scholasticism," is the philosophy and theology
of Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. The basic premise of all Scholastic
thought was "the conjuction of faith and reason." Scholasticism, THE COLUMBIA
ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (6 th ed. 2000) at http://www.infoplease.com/encyclope-
dia.html (last visited May 20, 2001).
7. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 26. See generally JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPAN-
ISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FRANCISO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NA-
TIONS (1934); John P. Doyle, Francisco Suarez: On Preaching the Gospel to People
Like the American Indians, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 879 (1992); Ram6n Hernindez,
The Internationalization of Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto, 15 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1031 (1992).
8. For an extremely helpful explanation of the role of natural law in international
law, see James V. Schall, S.J., Natural Law and the Law of Nations: Some Theoretical
Considerations, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 997 (1991). In particular, this author states:
[T]he law of nations itself was a necessary derivative from natural law. It
was based on the principle that human beings throughout time and space
were the same in their essential structure, in that they each possessed reason,
and that reason could be formulated, communicated, understood, and de-
bated wherever men sought understanding. The theories and actions of any-
one, even rules, could and should be tested by reason. This testing would
result in an agreed upon law if the reasonable solution could be found. It
would result in violence, disagreement, and even war if it could not.
Id. at 1017.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
1752
WISDOM OF NATURAL LAW
of decision-making necessary for natural law to inform interna-
tional law. Part V explains the suum cuique, 0 a critical precept in
natural law as it applies to international law. This essay concludes
that natural law principles that rely on practical reason can make
important substantive contributions to international law practice
today.
I. THE NATURAL LAW
The definition of the natural law must be addressed at the out-
set." In the Scholastic tradition, it is not a body of substantive law
in itself. Rather, it is a means by which the human mind formulates
legal principles that can then be applied to govern a specific juris-
diction. These principles include "the common good," "solidarity,"
"subsidiarity," and the "suum cuique."'2 Professor Charles Rice
has argued that natural law is a "guide to individual conduct" and
"serves as a standard for the laws enacted by the state."'1 3 As the
celebrated canonist Gratian, who most likely compiled his collec-
tion of canon law principles during the mid-to-latter part of the
twelfth century, noted in the Decretum: "Natural law is common to
all nations because it exists everywhere through instinct, not be-
cause of any enactment."' 4 In his commentary, Gratian explained
that the natural quality of law means "an instinct of nature pro-
ceeding from reason.' 1 5 In Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas
identified natural law as those precepts "appointed by reason."16
10. The complete phrase is suum cuique tribuere, meaning "[t]o render to every-
one his own." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (6th ed. 1990).
11. My treatment of what is natural law consists of the briefest of introductions.
Its brevity does not do it justice. It is simply an introduction that dispels some myth
about this crucial foundation of western legal thought.
12. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 10.
13. CHARLES E. RICE, FiFrY QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND
WHY WE NEED IT 30 (1993).
14. GRATIAN, THE TREATISE ON LAWS (DECRETUM DD.1-20) WITH THE ORDI-
NARY GLOSS. Distinction 1, C.7, § 2 (Augustine Thompson & James Gordley trans.,
The Catholic University of America Press 1993) (1140). Gratian defined "civil law"
as that which "each people and each commonwealth establishes as its own law for
divine or human reasons." Id. at C.8. The law of nations was given the explanation
that "all nations make use of it," and it "deals with the occupation of habitations, with
building, fortification, war, captivity, servitude, postliminy [the law under which some-
thing lost as a result of captivity is restored to the original owner from whom the item
was taken], treaties, armistices, truces, the obligation of not harming ambassadors,
and the prohibition of marriage with aliens." Id. at C.9.
15. GRATIAN, supra note 14, at C.7, § 2.
16. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 94, a. 1, p. 1008 (The Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Brothers 1947) (1273). Article 2
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His first principle of practical reason 17 is as follows: "[G]ood is to
be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided."' 8 In the present
day theories of natural law, the role of reason, especially practical
reason, is critical. For example, Professors Germain Grisez and
John Finnis have recognized the importance of practical reason to
natural law theory and have elaborated upon Aquinas's first princi-
ple. 9 Professor Robert George2" has described the contemporary
views of Professors Finnis and Grisez as the "new classical the-
ory."21 As George states:
According to this theory, the first principles of natural law are
not themselves moral principles. They are principles that extend
to and govern all intelligent practical deliberation, regardless of
whether it issues in morally upright choice, by directing action
toward possibilities that offer some intelligible benefit (and not
merely some emotional satisfaction). Such principles refer to
non-instrumental ... reasons for action. Reasons of this sort
are provided by ends that can be intelligently identified and pur-
sued, not merely as means to other ends, but as ends-in-
themselves. 22
Although present day philosophers and legal theorists may disa-
gree about the place of moral considerations in natural law theory,
there is little dispute about the role of reason. Reason and cogni-
of the same question goes on to argue that practical reason is a self-evident principle.
See infra note 17.
17. According to Rice, "[t]he first self-evident principle of the practical reason is
that 'good is that which all things seek after.'" RICE, supra note 13, at 117 (quoting
AQUINAS, supra note 16, at q. 94, a. 2, p. 1009).
18. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at q. 94, a. 2, p. 1009. As Ralph McInerny has stated:
Natural law is a dictate of reason. Precepts of natural law are rational direc-
tives aiming at the good for man. The human good, man's ultimate end, is
complex, but the unifying thread is the distinctive mark of the human, i.e.,
reason; so too law is a work of reason. Man does not simply have an instinct
for self-preservation. He recognizes self-preservation as a good and devises
ways and means to secure it in shifting circumstances.
Ralph Mclnerny, The Principles of Natural Law, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 5 (1980).
19. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (1980) (stating that
practical reasonableness distinguishes "sound from unsound practical thinking and...
provide[s] the criteria for distinguishing between . . . reasonable and unreasonable
acts"); Germain G. Grisez, The First Principle of Practical Reason, 10 NAT. LAW F.
168, 193-94 (1965) ("For practical reason, to know is to prescribe").
20. Professor George, the distinguished McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at
Princeton University, gave the inaugural lecture in November of 2000 at the Fordham
Natural Law Colloquium.
21. ROBERT GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW, NATURAL LAW AND IN-
TERNATIONAL ORDER 231 (1999).
22. Id. Professor McInerny, among others, concludes that the first principles of
natural law have a nexus with moral choice. See generally McInerny, supra note 18.
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tive function have played a crucial role in the evolution of law. As
Aquinas acknowledged, law may be understood as "an ordinance
of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community. '2 3 The use of reason eventually leads to the notion of
the common good-a principle that supports the existence of inter-
national law.24
II. THE COMMON GOOD
By way of introduction, Aquinas noted in his discussion of the
natural law that "other matters of law are ordained to the moral
common good. '25 Relying on Aquinas's work, Professor John Fin-
nis has observed that "the good that is common between friends is
not simply the good of successful collaboration or coordination,
nor is it simply the good of two successfully achieved coinciding
projects or objectives; it is the common good of mutual self-consti-
tution, self-fulfillment, self-realization."2 6 In a fundamental way,
the notion of the common good entails a sense of reciprocity in
which the Silver Rule 7 and the Golden Rule28 have a role. Profes-
sor Finnis has similarly commented on the importance of commu-
nity to the common good, for "the common good is the good of
individuals, living together and depending upon one another in
ways that favour the well-being of each."29 The concern about the
common good as a social, political, and legal subject reaches back
to the classical era of ancient Greece and Rome. Aristotle noted,
"[e]very state is a community of some kind, and every community
is established with a view to some good. ' 30 In looking at the politi-
cal institutions established to govern the community, he noted that
just governments are those "which have a regard to the common
interest. '31 In assessing what Aristotle considered to be just, one
23. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at q. 90, a. 4, p. 995.
24. A review of classical and contemporary writings on natural law will demon-
strate the connection between natural law and the common good. This is best illus-
trated through the adoption of the 1787 Constitution in the United States and the
impact of John Locke's Second Treatise on Government. U.S. CONST.; JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Prometheus Books 1986) (1690).
25. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at q. 94, a. 3, p. 1010; q. 95, a. 4.
26. FINNIS, supra note 19, at 141.
27. Tobit 4:15 ("Do to no one what you yourself dislike.").
28. Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31 ("Do to others whatever you would have them do to
you.").
29. FINNIS, supra note 19, at 305.
30. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 589 (Benjamin Jowett
trans., Richard McKeon ed., Modern Library 1992) (n.d.).
31. Id. at 629-30.
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can turn to his discourse on ethics where he supplied the founda-
tion for a vital theme: that justice is reciprocity and mutuality
through relationship.32 In placing the notion of reciprocity into the
human community, Aristotle contended that the truest or best
form of justice is the reciprocal display of friendship.33 Through
the use of reason, a person begins to recognize the role that mutu-
ality and reciprocity in human relationships have in developing the
common good. The ancient Roman Marcus Tullius Cicero shared
the sentiments of Aristotle when he suggested that a common-
wealth, or social order, emerges from the communal spirit of peo-
ple who make the commonwealth their "property." This idea is
based on the principles of "respect to justice" and "partnership for
the common good. ' 34 In writing for the emerging Christian com-
munity, St. Augustine reflected some of the views of Aristotle and
Cicero when he argued that the human race is not simply united
"in a society by natural likeness," but it is or should be "bound
together by a kind of tie of kinship to form a harmonious unity,
linked together by the 'bond of peace.' 3 Later, in the Middle
Ages, Thomas Aquinas, who was influenced by the ideas of Aris-
totle and Augustine, continued to examine the common good. Ac-
cording to Aquinas, the object of justice was to keep people
together in a society in which they share relationships with one an-
other. Specifically, Aquinas noted that "justice is about our deal-
ings not only with others, but also with ourselves."36 The notion of
justice being the reciprocity shared among members of society was
further refined by Aquinas when he argued "the virtue of a good
citizen is general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common
good."'37 Furthermore, Aquinas saw that:
[T]he good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct[s] man in
relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual per-
sons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs:
so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it
directs [each person] to the common good.38
32. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 433-34
(W.D. Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed., Modern Library 1992) (n.d.).
33. Id. at 502-03.
34. Cicero, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 65 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans.,
Harvard University Press 1928). (n.d.)
35. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS
547 (Betty Radice ed. & Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin Books 1984) (n.d.)
36. AQUINAS, supra note 16, at q. 58, a. 2, p. 1436.
37. Id. at art. 6, p. 1438.
38. Id. at art. 5, p. 1438.
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The twentieth century Christian philosopher Jacques Maritain
brought Aquinas's understanding of the common good into the
present.39 Maritain recognized the need to separate the dignity of
the individual human being from the dangers of the primacy of the
isolated individual and the promotion of the private good. For
Maritain, the common good was "the human common good" which
includes "the service of the human person."40 In large part, Mari-
tain, who was to have a role in the development of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,41 was responding to the threats
posed to the dignity of the human person by three forms of states
in the first half of the twentieth century: (1) the bourgeois liberal
state, (2) the communist state, and (3) the totalitarian state.4 2 Mar-
itain stated that the emphasis on individualism at the expense of
community results in "the tragic isolation of each one in his own
selfishness or helplessness. ' 43
Through his perceptive understanding of mid-twentieth century
social conditions, Maritain acknowledged that evil arises when "we
give preponderance to the individual aspect of our being."'44 He
recognized individualism as an evil because he understood that the
human being, as an individual, is, at the same time, a member of
the human community-a community in which the interests of
each complements the interests of all. Maritain concluded that
"bourgeois liberalism with its ambition to ground everything in the
unchecked initiative of the individual, conceived as a little God 45
was a threat to the dignity of the human being and the common
good. For Maritain, a definitive element of each human being is
the "inner urge to the communications of knowledge and love
which require relationship with other persons. '46 Maritain stated
that the individual human being and the community are not in con-
flict with one another because their vital interests are complemen-
39. Maritain was called upon by the United Nations Human Rights Commission
to chair and contribute to a symposium on the drafting of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. See generally Jacques Maritain, Introduction to UNITED NATIONS
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS: COM-
MENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1949).
40. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 19 (John J. Fitz-
gerald trans., 1947).
41. See generally MARITAIN, supra note 39.
42. MARITAIN, supra note 40, at 81.
43. Id. at 82-83.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 81-82.
46. Id. at 37.
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tary rather than contradictory. The words of Maritain are
compelling and insightful in this regard:
There is a correlation between this notion of the person as social
unit and the notion of the common good as the end of the social
whole. They imply one another. The common good is common
because it is received in persons, each one of whom is as a mir-
ror of the whole .... The end of society, therefore, is neither the
individual good nor the collection of the individual goods of
each of the persons who constitute ... the social body. But if
the good of the social body is not understood to be a common
good of human persons, just as the social body itself is a whole
of human persons, this conception also would lead to other er-
rors of a totalitarian type. The common good of the city is
neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper
good of a whole which, like the species with respect to its indi-
viduals or the hive with respect to its bees, relates the parts to
itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the good human
life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their com-
munion in good living.47
Within the international order, Maritain's views suggested that
the rights of an individual and the interests of the community are
compatible, harmonious, and complementary. The fundamental
rights of people and those of the society in which each person lives
share as the principal value "the highest access.., of the persons to
their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to the com-
munications of generosity consequent upon such expansion. '' a 8 For
Maritain, the expansion of each person's rights needs the commu-
nity. If a person is cut off from others, he is alone and must fend
for himself. However, when in a community (including the com-
munity of nations), he can rely on the generous support of others
to be a more complete human person.
As can be observed in many areas of international law practice
today, protection of the human person in all of his or her dignity
47. Id. at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 41. While writing from the perspective of a witness on the eve of World
War II, Maritain suggested that:
It is the task of a supreme effort of human freedom, in the mortal struggle in
which it is to-day engaged, to ensure that the age which we are entering is
not the age of the masses and of the shapeless multitudes nourished, brought
into subjection and led to the slaughter by infamous demigods, but rather
the age of the people, and of the man of common humanity-citizen and co-
inheritor of the civilized community - cognizant of the dignity of the human
person in himself, builder of a more human world directed toward an his-
toric ideal of human brotherhood.
JACQUES MARITAIN, CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY 64 (1946).
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requires insertion and participation in, not insulation and separa-
tion from, the community. The community prospers when its
members contribute of themselves in making it prosperous; it with-
ers when they turn within and tend only to their private cares.49 If
taken to extreme, such withdrawal leads to:
[A] world in which men and women do not exist for others; in
which, although there are no public censors, there can also be no
public goods .... In this world, there can be no fraternal feeling,
no general will, no selfless act, no mutuality, no species identity,
no gift relationship, no disinterested obligation, no social empa-
thy, no love or belief or commitment that is not wholly private.5 °
The notion of the common good raises human consciousness
about living a life that is interdependent rather than purely autono-
mous. A recent international conference on the global environ-
ment held by environmental ministers under the auspices of the
United Nations at Malm6, Sweden, illustrates this point.51 The
ministers' discussions centered on possible solutions to problems
that threaten the common good such as environmental problems.
The ministers suggested the most effective solutions would be im-
plemented by all the nations of the world, because solidarity, not
disunity, will be most effective in reducing environmental problems
of global impact.52 The concept of collaboration and coordination
to help solve mutual problems leads to the topic of solidarity.
III. SOLIDARITY
As the term suggests, "solidarity" within the context of natural
law theory takes account of bonds between one person and an-
other. The bonds exist not simply because people desire them;
they exist because people have, through the application of their
reason, discovered that problems they face in common are best ad-
dressed through cooperation. Cooperation enables nation-states to
49. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR
A NEW AGE 4 (1984). ("From this precarious foundation [of individualism and pri-
vacy], no firm theory of citizenship, participation, public goods, or civic virtue can be
expected to arise").
50. Id. at 71-72.
51. See generally The Global Ministerial Environmental Forum, The Malt6 Min-
isterial Declaration, U.N. Environment Programme, 6 h Sess., 5 h plen. mtg. (2000),
available at http://www.unep.org/malmo.
52. Id. 1 l, 3, 21.
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come to one another's mutual aid, as well as to benefit those who
are harmed or threatened.53
An important illustration of solidarity within the realm of inter-
national law is found in the Charter of the United Nations.54 A ma-
jor purpose of the United Nations Organization is to "achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character. '55 It is prop-
erly assumed that such cooperation amongst nations, regardless of
size, wealth, or resources, is essential to combating whatever
threatens the peace and security of mankind.56 Of course, such co-
operation requires those friendly relations essential to universal
peace.57 In the advancement of universal human rights, "friendly
relations between nations" is essential, and nations "in co-opera-
tion with the United Nations" must pledge themselves to "univer-
sal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 58
In the context of the Catholic Church's long involvement with
the international order based on natural law and the establishment
and preservation of the international community, the Second Vati-
can Council concluded in 1965 that the solidarity of mankind ne-
cessitates "a revival of greater international cooperation in the
economic field. ' 59 The Council continued by stating that although
most "peoples have become autonomous, they are far from being
free of every form of undue dependence, and far from escaping all
danger of serious internal difficulties. "60
53. Within the Roman Catholic tradition, the concept of solidarity has appeared in
many documents treating the social teachings of the Church. See CHARLES E. RICE,
FIFTY QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT Is IT AND WHY WE NEED IT 228-29
(1993); see also POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS: ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF HIS
HOLINESS POPE JOHN XXIII N. 98 (William J. Gibbons ed., 1963); POPE PAUL VI,
POPULORUM PROGRESSIo: ENCYCLICAL LETTER ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLES
nn. 17, 44, 48, 52, 62, 64, 65, 67, 73, 84 (1967).
54. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
56. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-2.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Aristotle once suggested in his Nichomachean
Ethics that the truest form of justice is "true friendship" where the interests of the
other are placed before the interests of the self. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 32, at 502-
07.
58. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., 1 17th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
59. VATICAN COUNCIL II, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE
MODERN WORLD (GAUDIUM ET SPES) 1 85 (Dec. 7, 1965).
60. Id.
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Without solidarity, issues vital to resolving conflict and other
problems encountered by the international community may remain
irresolvable. The relevance of solidarity between peoples and
states does not imply, however, that there must be one global au-
thority responsible for maintaining it. Instead, the concept of sub-
sidiarity holds that a central organization should perform only
those tasks that cannot be implemented at a more local level.
IV. SUBSIDIARITY
The concept of "subsidiarity" in natural law theory generally en-
compasses the importance of reasoned decision-making at the low-
est level of social and political structures in which decisions are
implemented.6 It has been noted that the doctrine of subsidiarity
provides latitude for achieving the common good.62 As Professor
E.B.F. Midgley observed some years ago, "just as the natural law
does not specify ... the correct size and scope of a part of human-
ity which should properly be organized as one political unit.., the
natural law does not dictate any specific detailed hierarchy of polit-
ical authorities as the correct means for the perfecting of the politi-
cal organization of both the parts and the whole of the human
race." 63 In essence, subsidiarity is a fundamentally democratic and
egalitarian principle identified by practical reason that acknowl-
edges the right of self-determination of peoples. It is especially
pertinent to note that under international law the fundamental unit
of society is the family, not the state.64 The principle of subsidiarity
is recognized as a fundamental principle of the United Nations Or-
ganization. 65 As the Charter of the United Nations declares, one of
the primary purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
61. "Subsidiarity" is a sociological theory holding that "functions which
subordinate or local organizations perform effectively belong more properly to them
than to a dominant central organization." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICrIONARY 2279 (1st ed. 1986).
62. E.B.F. MIDGLEY, THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION AND THE THEORY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS 352 (1975).
63. Id.
64. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 58, at art. 16.310.1;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N.GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art. 23.1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art. 23.1, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). As these
crucial texts suggest, the basic unit of society should be free from imposition by the
States when families make crucial decisions for the welfare of the group and the indi-
viduals who comprise it.
65. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
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of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. ' 66 The United
Nations promoted this purpose on December 14, 1960, when the
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, thereby recognizing
the sovereignty of subjugated peoples against colonial powers.67 In
this declaration, the approving U.N. members stated that "all peo-
ples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of
their sovereignty, and the integrity of their national territory."68
The concept of "self-determination"-an exercise of sub-
sidiarity- appears to enjoy a protected status in the world of inter-
national law.69 It is a concept synthesizing the interests of the
individual with those of the community.7 ° The interests of both the
individual and the community converge on the ability of individu-
als to exercise their preferences for how they wish to live their
lives.71 Professor Brownlie has noted the overlap of interests be-
66. Id. In attempting to define for international law the meaning of the term
"peoples," the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Greco-Bulgarian
"Communities," defined the term to mean "a group of people living on a delimited
territory, possessing distinct religious, racial, linguistic, or other cultural attributes and
desiring to preserve its special characteristics." 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 21
(July 31). As Prof. Wolfrum has pointed out, "[t]his definition may seem to be rather
superficial, but a better one has not been found." See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 64 (Bruno Simma ed., 1995) [hereinafter CHARTER COM-
MENTARY]. Furthermore, as Pope John Paul II has noted, "[e]very nation... has also
the right to shape its life according to its own traditions, excluding, of course, every
abuse of basic human rights and in particular the oppression of minorities. Every
nation has the right to build its future by providing an appropriate education for the
younger generation." Pope John Paul II, Address of His Holiness, Pope John Paul H to
the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (Oct. 5, 1995).
67. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961).
68. Id. These principles were reiterated on February 23, 1998, when approving
U.N. members reiterated that in "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples ... all peoples can freely determine, without external inter-
ference, their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development" and that "it is the concern solely of peoples to determine methods and
to establish institutions regarding the electoral process .... "Respect for the Principles
of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of States in their
Electoral Processes, G.A. Res. 52/119, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 70th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/52/119 (1997).
69. For some helpful background discussion about "self-determination" as a right
encompassing the practice of self-government, see generally Hurst Hannum, Rethink-
ing Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993).
70. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LE-
GAL REAPPRAISAL (1995) (giving a current and careful examination of "self determi-
nation" as a principle and right).
71. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 58 (1992).
1762
WISDOM OF NATURAL LAW
tween the individual and the identifiable group. 72 He defines self-
determination as "the right of cohesive national groups (to choose
for themselves a form of political organization and their relation to
other groups. 73
This theme appears in the Charter of the United Nations. The
founders of the U.N., applying the practical reasoning of natural
law, agreed that the organization existed to encourage friendly re-
lations amongst nations "based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. '74 The historical
importance of self-determination and subsidiarity surfaced in the
case Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.,75 when Judge Am-
moun stated in his separate opinion:
Thus, among these principles there is the right of self-determina-
tion demanded for centuries by the nations which successively
acquired their independence in the two Americas, beginning
with the 13 Confederate States in North America, and in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe; many times proclaimed since the First
World War; enshrined finally in the Charter of the United Na-
tions, added to and clarified by the General Assembly's resolu-
tion of 16 December 1952 on the right of self-determination and
the historic Declaration by the Assembly on 14 December 1960
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, the consequences of which have not yet fully unfolded
.... Against the defenders of the last bastions of traditional law,
there thus stand arrayed, once again, with the support of a West-
ern minority, the serried ranks of the jurists, thinkers and men
of action of the Latin American and Afro-Asian countries, as
72. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 599 (5th ed.
1998) ("It is not necessarily the case that there is a divorce between the legal and
human rights of groups, on the one hand, and individuals, on the other.").
73. Id. Brownlie continues by stating that "[t]he choice may be independence as a
state, association with other groups in a federal state, or autonomy or assimilation in a
unitary (non-federal) state." Id. As Professor Cassese has pointed out, "there is no
self-determination without democratic decision-making." CASSESE, supra note 70, at
54.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.2. According to Professor Wolfrum, the right of self-
determination may be a precondition to all other individual human rights. See CHAR-
TER COMMENTARY, supra note 66, at 62. The principle of "equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples" is reiterated in Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations,
which begins Chapter IX, International Economic and Social Cooperation. See CHAR-
TER COMMENTARY, supra note 66. Moreover, on December 16, 1952, the U.N. mem-
bership generally recommended that "the States Members of the United Nations shall
uphold the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations." G.A. Res. 637
A, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1952). Interestingly, a
distinction-be it intentional or mistaken-was made in this resolution between "na-
tions" and "peoples." See id.
75. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 311-312 (Feb. 5)
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well as of the socialist countries. For all of them self-determina-
tion is now definitely part of positive international law. As is
known, furthermore, a majority of States, through their repre-
sentatives at the 1969 Vienna Conference on the Law of Trea-
ties, pronounced in favour of a solution to the problem of jus
cogens capable of giving definitive sanction to the principles of
the Charter, regarded by them as imperative juridical norms. It
thus seemed appropriate that those principles-not excepting
those deriving originally from the spirit of the American or
French Revolutions-the religious inspiration of which is not un-
known, should be solemnly reaffirmed ....16
Today, the principle of self-determination and the correlative
principle of subsidiarity are pillars of international law.77
Many states, even those emerging from totalitarian dictatorships,
have provided a context for the concept of "self-determination."
For example, the Croatia Index Constitution of 1990 speaks of
"the generally accepted principles in the modern world and the in-
alienable, indivisible, nontransferable and inexpendable right of
the Croatian nation to self-determination and state sovereignty, in-
cluding the inviolable right to secession and association. '7 8 The
76. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 311-312 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge
Ammoun). Professor Cassese has cautioned against too widespread a use of Judge
Ammoun's separate opinion. In Professor Cassese's words, "these views cannot be
held to reflect State practice, although they are highly indicative of the new trends
emerging in the international community and may contribute, and have indeed con-
tributed, to the evolution of State practice." CASSESE, supra note 70, at 136. Cassese
further suggests that at the time Barcelona Traction was decided in 1970, Western
states still had great investments in colonial domains; therefore, they "opposed the
provision on self-determination either on account of their colonial interests, or out of
fear that the paragraph relating to the free disposition of natural resources imperiled
foreign investments and enterprises in developing countries." Id. at 50.
77. Ian Brownlie, renowned publicist and practicing lawyer states:
The present position is that self-determination is a legal principle, and the
United Nations organs do not permit Article 2, paragraph 7, to impede dis-
cussion and decision when the principle is in issue. Its precise ramifications
in other contexts are not yet worked out, and it is difficult to do justice to the
problems in a small compass. The subject has three aspects. First, the prin-
ciple informs and complements other general principles of international law,
viz., of state sovereignty, the equality of states, and the equality of peoples
within a state. Thus, self-determination is employed in conjunction with the
principle of non-intervention in relation to the use of force and otherwise.
Secondly, the concept of self-determination has been applied in the different
context of economic self-determination. Lastly, the principle appears to
have corollaries which may include [territorial sovereignty, considerations
involving statehood and its recognition, legitimacy of certain liberation
movements, and establishment of new sovereign territories.]
BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 601-02.
78. CROAT. CONST. pmbl.
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French Constitution of 1958, echoing President Abraham Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, speaks of "government of the people, by the
people, and for the people. '79 In the 1949 German constitution,
the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the authors
declare that the people "have achieved the unity and freedom of
Germany in free self-determination."8
In 1975, the International Court of Justice further defined the
term self-determination in an advisory opinion concerning the re-
gion of the Western Sahara.81 In noting the possible application of
Article 1.2 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Court acknowl-
edged that the United Nation's Declaration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples82 enunciated the
"principle of self-determination as a right of peoples" and the ap-
plication of this right "for the purpose of bringing all colonial situa-
tions to a speedy end."' 83 In its commentary, the Court noted that
the right of self-determination "requires a free and genuine expres-
sion of the will of the peoples concerned" with the exercise or at-
tempted exercise of this right.84 On several occasions, the Court
offered a basic definition of this right as "the freely expressed will
of peoples 85 or "the free expression of the wishes of the people. 86
79. CONSTITUTION DE 1958 art. 2 (R.F.) This language from the 1958 French Con-
stitution might be read in the context of Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, in
which the President concluded his remarks by saying: "The world will little note nor
long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for
us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who
fought here have, thus far, so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated
to the great task remaining before us ... that we here highly resolve that these dead
shall not have died in vain, that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of
freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not
perish from the earth." President Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedi-
cation of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 21 (P. Bayer ed., 1953) (emphasis added).
80. F.R.G. CONST. pmbl.
81. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
82. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 67.
83. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) at 31. Professor
Brownlie implies that this Declaration "regards the principle of self-determination as
a part of the obligations stemming from the Charter [of the United Nations], and is
not a 'recommendation', but is in the form of an authoritative interpretation of the
Charter." BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 600.
84. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 32.
85. Id. at 33.
86. Id. at 35. Professor Cassese argues that this discussion from Western Sahara
offers a principle with a "very loose standard"-as he says, "the principle sets out a
general and fundamental standard of behaviour: governments must not decide the life
and future of peoples at their discretion. Peoples must be enabled freely to express
their wishes in matters concerning their condition." CASSESE, supra note 70, at 128.
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In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly reiterated these
points in its Declaration on the Right of Development.87 By recal-
ling the right of peoples to self-determination, the General Assem-
bly asserted that:
States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and fla-
grant violations of the human rights of peoples and human be-
ings affected by situations such as those resulting from
apartheid, all forms of racism and racial discrimination, colonial-
ism, foreign domination and occupation, aggression, foreign in-
terference and threats against national sovereignty, national
unity and territorial integrity, threats of war and refusal to rec-
ognize the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination.88
The General Assembly restated this position in a 1997 resolution
addressing the respect for principles of national sovereignty and
non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral
processes. 89
The notion of subsidiarity is also enshrined in international legal
instruments. For example, two of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights's ("UDHR") 90 most notable progeny are the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") 9' and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR");92 both state at the outset in their common Ar-
ticle 1 that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 93
87. G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/RES/41/
128 (1986).
88. Id.
89. G.A. Res. 644, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 112(b), addendum pt. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/52/644/Add. 2 (1997).
90. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, Resolutions, 71 (1948), re-
printed in JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
APPENDIX (1999) [herinafter UDHR].
91. G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
92. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
93. ICCPR supra, note 91, at art. 1; ICESCR supra, note 92, at art. 1 Article 21.3
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would appear to offer a basis of sup-
port for the common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR in stating that "[t]he
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."
UDHR supra, note 90, at art. 21.3. One commentator has observed that Article 21 of
the UDHR "is more basic than the legal rights described [earlier] because it gives
people the human right to help codify the moral principles of the other legal human
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This statement brings together subsidiarity, popular sovereignty,
human rights, and self-determination into a legal synthesis.
As normative texts that generate legal obligations for more than
one hundred and forty nation-state parties,94 the ICCPR and the
ICESCR have served as the basis for ongoing recognition of the
legal status of self-determination and the principle of subsidiarity
in international law.95 Even though specific applications of the
common Article 1 may present special challenges, the idea of "self-
determination" has been given political as well as social, economic,
and cultural contexts. Although their respective second articles are
different, each covenant acknowledges state responsibility to "re-
spect," "ensure," "achieve," or "guarantee" the rights specified in
the applicable covenant.96
Although the ICCPR acknowledges that some restrictions on
protecting rights may exist during times of "public emergency, 97
certain rights (e.g., (i) the right to life; (ii) freedom from torture,
rights into their own domestic systems. Most of what a government does is to write
laws, which is why one early version of Article 21 speaks of everyone's 'right to take
an effective part directly or through his representative in the formation of law.'"
MORSINK, supra note 90, at 69. Matthew Craven has noted that since the ICESCR
shares this common article with ICCPR and since the latter covenant has been under-
stood to protect civil and political rights, the same provision in the ICESCR would
protect rights to economic self-determination. See MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE
ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 24-25 (1995). See also CASSESE, supra note 70, at 66.
94. Not every state that is a party to one of the two conventions is automatically a
party to both of them. Each convention requires its own independent ratification. In
addition, many states ratify with reservations concerning specific issues.
95. As of July of 1999, according to United Nations on-line archives, the ICCPR
has one hundred and forty-four states as parties, http://www.un.org/Dept/Treaty/final/
ts2/newfiles/part-boo/iv_4.html, and the ICESCR has one hundred and forty-one
states as parties, http://www.un.org/Dept/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part-boo/iv_3.html.
See also Robert McCorquodale, Negotiating Sovereignty: The Practice of the United
Kingdom in Regard to the Right of Self-Determination, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 283
(1995).
96. For example, ICCPR art. 2, para. 1-2 states that "[e]ach State Party... under-
takes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant .... [E]ach State party ...
undertakes to take the necessary steps ... to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant." ICCPR supra note 91, at art. 2. ICESCR art. 2, para. 1-2 states
that "[e]ach State Party . . . undertakes to take steps ... with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by
all appropriate means .... The States Parties ... undertake to guarantee that the
rights enunciated ... will be exercised without discrimination .... " ICESCR, supra
note 92, at art. 2.
97. ICCPR, supra note 91, at art. 4.1. For an instructive discussion of this issue,
see JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1992), where the author addresses violations of basic human rights in times of
emergency and derogation under both treaty and customary law; notwithstanding der-
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slavery, and imprisonment for debt; (iii) recognition as a person
before the law; and (iv) freedom of thought, religion, and con-
science) cannot be derogated.98 Under the ICESCR, no state,
group, multi-national corporation, or person has the "right to en-
gage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction
of any of the rights or freedoms recognized by the ICESCR." 99
The ICCPR echoes this same provision. 10
Because most states are parties to the ICCPR and the ICESCR,
they have obligations to respect the fundamental precepts of
human rights defined by the political processes protected by the
popular sovereignty of the people and in the exercise of the peo-
ple's self-determination and the correlative principle of sub-
sidiarity. Any external organ would be prohibited from imposing
its view on a people who have given particulars to their rights as
defined by these two important conventions in the exercise of their
own sovereignty and self-determination.
V. THE SUUM QUIQUE
The maxim of the "suum cuique"'' is found in other ancient le-
gal precepts. For example, there is juris praecepta sunt haec-
honeste vivere; alterum non laedere; suum cuique tribuere-02-these
are the precepts of the law: to live honorably; to hurt nobody; to
render everyone his due. Another is a traditional definition of jus-
tice: justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique
tribuendi-justice is a steady and unceasing disposition to render
everyone his due.
The concept underlying these various formulations may be
summed up in the following manner. Justice-an issue of vital im-
portance to most understandings of natural law-is a critical ele-
ment of legal systems and international order. In the natural law
realm, justice often is considered to exist in the context of the suum
ogation provisions and provisions of customary law, there remain obligations concern-
ing the protection of basic rights.
98. ICCPR, supra note 91, at art. 4.3. For an examination about whether certain
human rights are derogable, see Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights
Treaties, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281 (1976).
99. ICESCR, supra note 92, at art. 5.1.
100. ICCPR, supra note 91, at art. 5.1.
101. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10.
102. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, App. (7th ed. 1999) ("These are the
precepts of the law: to live honorably, not to injure another, to render to each person
his due.").
1768
WISDOM OF NATURAL LAW
cuique. °3 In essence, the justice due someone relates to what is
due others. Therefore, the justice for one cannot be determined
until what is just for others involved with the same question is con-
sidered. In the context of international law,1"4 the suum cuique in a
natural law context plays a significant role.
For example, the Preamble of the United Nations's Charter sug-
gests the suum cuique in that it states that the Peoples of the
United Nations "are determined ... to reaffirm faith .. .in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.' 0 5
The Preamble additionally states that such ends shall be furthered
by employing "international machinery for the promotion of eco-
nomic and social advancement of all peoples.' 0 6 The substantive
provisions of the Charter elaborate upon the principles of the
equality of people and states. 07
The UDHR also elaborates on the interrelation of equality
amongst all peoples when it states that a common standard of
achievement "for all peoples and all nations" shall apply. The
UDHR further acknowledges that the universality of rights when it
states that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights." 10 8 Moreover, it declares that each person is "endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in
a spirit of brotherhood."'1 9 But, as the suum cuique requires, the
UDHR speaks not just for some, but for all.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the subjects of international law stand the
best chance of prospering when cooperation, solidarity, the com-
mon good, and subsidiarity are pursued. The shared method un-
derlying these elements is the natural law-the use of reason, the
gift of the human intellect, to see what challenges face the human
family and what is needed to overcome these obstacles through the
assistance needed by all, not just some. It is the natural law, and its
first principle of practical reason, that informs decision-makers
103. See generally Robert John Araujo, S.J., Justice as Right Relationship: A Philo-
sophical and Theological Reflection on Affirmative Action, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 377
(2000).
104. Id.
105. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
106. Id.
107. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55, para. b (international economic and social cooperation
for the benefit of all peoples) art. 2.1 (sovereign equality of all States).
108. UDHR, supra note 90, at art. 1.
109. Id.
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what is needed to allow all members of the human community to
flourish.
As this brief essay has attempted to demonstrate, natural law is
no stranger to the development of international law. Conse-
quently, lawyers who practice in this area would profit by being
familiar with the natural law and the contributions it has made and
continues to make to international law.
